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Introduction 
 
The Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE) 
is the largest study of new firm formation ever undertaken in Australia1. In a nutshell, 
CAUSEE aims to uncover the factors that initiate, hinder and facilitate the process of 
emergence and development of new, independent firms. This is achieved by following 
the development of two, large samples of early stage business ventures – Nascent 
Firms; i.e., efforts that are under way but have not yet become operating businesses, 
and Young Firms, that is, firms that started trading in 2004 or later. Founders of these 
firms have been taken through a comprehensive telephone interview about the state 
and development of their start-ups. The project will follow the development of these 
nascent and young firms over a four year period. CAUSEE is the first large-scale, 
longitudinal study of emerging businesses in Australia to employ the novel and 
rigorous methodology of capturing emerging firms and following them over time that 
was first developed for the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) in the 
US (Gartner, Shaver, Carter, & Reynolds, 2004). For more background on CAUSEE, 
see Davidsson, Steffens, Gordon and Reynolds (2008) and references therein. 
This report presents some initial analyses that describe the particularly 
interesting and important minority of ‘high potential’ (HP) start-ups, using the first 
wave of survey data. We will compare the HP start-ups with a random sample of start-
ups that do not fulfil our criteria for being classified as HP. To a lesser extent we will 
also comment on differences between Nascent and Young HPs. Although some 
reported findings may have important implications it should be realised that what is 
presented here represents just an early glimpse of the rich scholarly and practice-
orientated output that the project can yield. 
 
Method and Sample Description 
 
The main, random sample  
 
After comprehensive questionnaire development work, a version of the survey 
instrument was pre-tested on a convenience sample of 71 nascent and young 
businesses in Nov.-Dec., 2006. After analysis, re-design, programming and internal 
testing a full scale pilot test with computer aided telephone interviewing (CATI) using 
a random digit dialling (RDD) procedure was commissioned to TNS and undertaken 
in April-May, 2007. This pilot test included contact with some 1,810 Australian 
                                                 
1 The study is made possible by the generous support through two Australian Research Council grants 
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households for a yield of 78 nascent- or young firm founders who also completed the 
full interview2. After further testing and re-design the large scale screening for 
eligible cases started in early July 2007 and continued into April, 2008.  
In the main study, a total of 28,383 adults (with equal male/female representation) in 
the randomly selected households completed a screening interview. In order to qualify 
for inclusion as NF or YF spokesperson the respondent first had to answer 
affirmatively to at least one of the following questions: 
 
1. Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business, including any 
self-employment or selling any goods or services to others? 
2. Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business or a new 
venture for your employer, an effort that is part of your normal work? 
3. Are you, alone or with others currently the owner of a business you help manage, 
including self-employment or selling any goods or services to others? 
 
Both categories of respondents also had to confirm that they were (or intended 
to be) owners or part owners of the (emerging) firm. Further, for the NF category they 
had to confirm they had undertaken some concrete ‘start-up behaviour’ such as 
looking for equipment or a location, organizing a start-up team, working on a business 
plan, etc., within the last 12 months. Otherwise, or else they were deemed under 
qualified. Conversely, if they confirmed that the firm’s revenues had exceeded 
expenses for six of the last 12 months they were deemed over qualified (and instead 
tested for eligibility in the YF category). Finally, the preliminary YF cases were 
retained if they confirmed that they started “trading in the market doing the type of 
business you are currently doing” in 2004 or later.  
This process yielded 977 Nascent Firms (3.4%) and 1,011 Young Firms (3.6%). 
These were directed to the full length interview (40-60 minutes) either directly 
following the screener or later by appointment. The full length interviews were 
completed by 594 NF and 514 YF cases to be used in our analyses 
 
The high potential over sample 
 
To identify ‘high potential’ businesses at an early stage for the purpose of 
comparing their characteristics with ‘regular’ start-ups is a very challenging task. First, 
there is no agreed-upon definition of ‘high potential businesses. Second, by any 
meaningful definition they are rare, so obtaining a sizeable sample of them is even 
more difficult than is sampling ‘regular’ start-ups at an early stage (before they appear 
in any registers). A random sample of start-ups will, of course, include a proportion of 
HP start-ups; however, when a sufficiently demanding HP definition is employed that 
proportion is likely to be small. Obtaining a large enough random sample of such 
entities may therefore be impossible or prohibitively costly. On the other hand, if they 
are identified through a single type of source (e.g., business incubators; business angel 
networks) the sample would almost certainly be biased compared to the theoretical 
category the study intends to investigate. Third, no single criterion (e.g., founders’ 
track record; booming industry; being highly innovative) can with satisfactory 
accuracy determine whether or not a start-up has ‘high potential’. Fourth, there is no 
natural dividing line between HP and non-HH businesses; in order to delineate such 
groups an arbitrary cut-off has to be introduced in what is truly a continuous 
distribution of varying potential. Hence, there is no ‘right’ or ‘perfect’ way to obtain a 
                                                 
2 These cases from the pilot round are not included in the analyses presented in this paper 
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group of HP start-ups. No matter how it is done, a proportion of those defined as HPs 
will fail or show rather pedestrian development while some start-ups not defined as 
HPs will become successful and significant business entities. However, early 
definition of a group of HPs that eventually turn out to be markedly over represented 
among high performers should be possible.   
In order to secure a large enough HP group in the CAUSEE data we decided to 
add judgment samples of 100+ ‘high potential’ cases in each of the NF and YF 
categories. These were sourced from a wide range of organisations that might get in 
contact with this type of start-ups. The use of many different sources served to 
minimize any particular bias in the sample. The ‘suspected’ HP cases were subjected 
to an expanded, customised screening using a combination of criteria relating to 
human capital (education, management experience, and start-up experience); 
aspirations (growth orientation); technological sophistication and novelty 
(innovation; IP protection); and being in a ‘growth friendly’ industry. A compensatory 
scoring system was developed such that no particular characteristic was necessary for 
HP status whereas a predefined total score had to be reached across the dimensions. 
Cases that reached this pre-defined total score were included in the study and 
subjected to the full length interview. The criteria for distinguishing between NF and 
YF were the same as in the random sample.    
 
The HP and non-HP cases contrasted in this report 
 
One possible approach for analysing the distinctive characteristics of HP start-
ups would be to compare the over sample just discussed with the random sample. 
However, such an approach would have certain disadvantages. First, as noted above a 
random sample will include a proportion of cases that also satisfy our HP criteria. 
This would blur the theoretical categories being compared. Second, preliminary 
analyses suggested this proportion was higher than expected (approx. 20%). This 
indicates that the original cut-off for HP eligibility may have been too lenient. For the 
purpose of this report we decided to follow a slightly different approach. We raised 
the cut-off so that no more than approximately 10 percent of the random sample 
would reach it. We then combined the over sample cases that satisfied this stricter 
criterion (135 out of 215) with the randomly selected cases that also satisfied the 
stricter criterion (127 out of 1186). For a total HP sample of 262 cases. Of the HPs, 
155 are nascent firms and the remaining 107 are Young Firms. These will be 
contrasted with ‘regular’ (or non-HP) start-ups, that is, those 1059 cases in the 
random sample that do not fulfil HP criteria.  
Further preliminary analyses revealed that although the HPs drawn from the 
random and judgment samples both fulfil the same minimum criteria, the sub-group 
drawn from the judgment sample is in many respects more ‘distinct’ or ‘extreme’ than 
their randomly selected counterparts. However, by combining the two HP subgroups 
we argue we obtain a theoretically meaningful sample of HPs. This sample will be 
compared to a likewise theoretically meaningful group on non-HPs. While HP vs. 
non-HP differences are often smaller when only cases from the random sample are 
compared the differences we comment on are still substantial in such a comparison 
unless otherwise stated. 
Using non-randomly sampled cases and multiple criteria for HP definition has 
some negative consequences. First, HPs will be different by definition from non-HP 
start-ups on all criteria included in the HP screener. Therefore, we report such 
differences as ‘sample descriptions’ rather than as ‘findings’. We will also be cautious 
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with differences regarding characteristics that were not included as HP screener 
criteria but which more or less by necessity are correlated with them. Second, both 
this dependence on sampling criteria and the inclusion of non-randomly sampled 
cases make statistical tests ambiguous. Although we have employed such testing to 
make sure we do not over interpret results that could easily have occurred by chance 
we are aware that conditions for strict applicability of statistical inference are not 
fulfilled.  
Importantly, CAUSEE employs the firm or ‘venture’ as the focal level of 
analysis. This means, for example, that years of experience is calculated across all 
founders for team start-ups, and that the presence of this or that education- or 
experience based knowledge means that any member of the founding team has it; not 
necessarily the respondent. 
Table 1 reports some of the differences between HPs and other start-ups along 
those criteria that were used to define the groups. As can be seen, the HP group seems 
to have much more education, experience and technological sophistication. They also 
have much higher aspirations. The median values for expected future size may not 
impress everybody in an absolute sense, but in relation to other start-ups they are 
massive and the HP medians not being even higher reflects that very few businesses 
grow to significant size at young age. The fact that YFs tend to be more modest than 
NFs on several criteria suggests the HPs aspirations are over- rather than under stated.  
 
Table 1. Sample description 
 
 Nascent Firms (NF) Young Firms (YF) 
 High 
Potential 
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
Uni education (1 or more of owners 
have), % 
65 44 75 41 
Prior start-up experience, % 82 53 83 43 
Management experience, (median yrs) 20 10 20 10 
Expected revenue in 5 years (median) 6,000,000 100,000 7,750,000 120,000 
Exp. No. of employees in 5 yrs (med.) 20 2 20 2 
Max growth pref. to manageable size, % 90 15 83 12 
Sees R&D spending as major priority, % 77 40 80 22 
Perceives firm as high-tech, % 66 26 69 24 
Has applied for IP protection, % 48 6 57 9 
Novelty in venture idea (12 pt. scale) 5.5 3.6 5.2 2.2 
Industry: Manufacturing, % 23 7 16 4 
Industry: Communications, % 8 4 9 4 
Industry: Business consulting, % 10 8 18 14 
Industry: Retailing, % (not criterion) 5 18 5 10 
 
 Let us here also comment on a number of differences that are indirectly (and 
not fully deterministically) driven by the HP definition criteria. Although not an 
explicit criterion the HP group also has much more industry experience than non-HP 
start ups (median 20 vs. 8.5 years for NFs and 24 vs. 10 years for YFs; i.e., the 
median difference is even greater than for management experience). According to 
some previous research this may be a major contributor to their eventual success 
(Wagner, 2004). The YF vs. NF difference we find in our data is in line with that 
notion. The higher levels of education and experience also translate to a range of 
functional areas. HPs report much more experience in all functional fields 
(sales/marketing; finance/accounting; administration/human resource management; 
 4
Industry-specific product/service development and production/service delivery 
knowledge). Education-based knowledge is also higher for HPs, but not impressively 
so as regards sales/marketing and administration/HRM. Given the high proportion of 
manufacturing firms among the HPs it is hardly surprising that a much higher 
proportion in that category has a product rather than a service focus. Among HPs 68 
percent of the NFs and 59 percent of the YFs (intend to) mainly sell products. The 
corresponding figures for non-HPs are 45 and 30 percent, respectively.  
Given their other characteristics it is hardly surprising that more money has 
been invested in the HPs than in other start-ups. In about half of the cases (46% for 
NFs and 52% for YFs) the HPs have invested $100,000 or more so far. The 
corresponding shares for non-HPs are 9 and 16 percent, respectively.  
Although this result is not driven by sampling criteria it may not surprise that 
HPs have higher (intended) proportion of their sales generated online. Given the low 
proportion of retailers among HPs such a result is not a given, although it does turn 
out to be the case for NFs. Among nascent HPs the proportion intending to have at 
least half of their revenue generated via the Internet is 40 percent. The corresponding 
figure for nascent non-HPs is 24 percent. There is no HP vs. non-HP difference for 
YFs as regards online sales.  
 Having start-up experience also makes it likely (but not a logical necessity) to 
find a higher occurrence among HPs of the founders running other businesses in 
parallel with the current start-up. This is the case, and the difference is pronounced. 
The NF and YF proportions running at least one more business in parallel is 66 and 59 
percent for HPs, versus only 29 and 21 percent for non-HPs. 
 Overall, the descriptive data suggest our criteria have led to the delineation of 
a sub-group of start-ups that is markedly different from other start-ups and which can 
with reasonable justification be labelled ‘high potential start-ups’. 
 
 
Findings 
 
Who starts high potential businesses? Teams do! 
 
Both in research and popular media, ‘the entrepreneur’ was for long portrayed 
as something of an omnipotent, lone wolf. It therefore came as something of a 
surprise when the PSED research showed that 50 percent or more of ‘nascent 
entrepreneurs’ in a random sample work in a team (Delmar & Davidsson, 2000; Ruef, 
Aldrich, & Carter, 2003). However, this may also have led to a misconception in the 
other direction, namely that the type of team that dominates textbook expositions (e.g., 
Timmons, 1999) – the highly educated; functionally well balanced team with high 
growth aspirations – is a very common phenomenon empirically. Ruef et al. (2003) 
showed that a large proportion of ‘start-up teams’ consist of romantic partners 
creating life style businesses and that a large proportion of the remainder does not 
conform to the textbook norm, either. 
However, the founders of HP businesses in the CAUSEE data to a 
considerable extent do match the textbook image of entrepreneurial teams. The 
difference is particularly pronounced when the YF category is compared concerning 
the prevalence of teams consisting of the respondent plus members other that than the 
spouse (or de facto partner). A full 69 percent of HP-YFs are founded by such teams, 
while only 13 percent of the non-HP young firms have that type of founding team. 
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This is a very sizeable difference. By contrast, the proportion of spouse teams is low 
among HPs. Table 2 summarises some of the differences. 
 
Table 2.  Prevalence of team start-ups 
 
 Nascent Firms (NF) Young Firms (YF) 
 High 
Potential 
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
Started by a team rather than single founder, % 68 47 79 44 
Started by non-spouse team, % 54 21 69 13 
Started by spouse team, % 14 26 10 31 
 
The fact that among HPs the team proportion is higher for NFs than for YFs 
may indicate that HPs started by teams are more likely to get operational and survive 
the first, critical years. 
The higher incidence of teams among HPs is in part driven by the education 
and experience criteria for inclusion as HP. All else kept the same, a team will have 
more human capital than a single founder. However, the full magnitude of the group 
difference, and in particular the spouse-team vs. non-spouse team pattern, cannot be 
explained as an artefact of the sampling criteria.  
 
How are HP start-ups initiated? 
 
  It is commonly believed that business founders first decide that they want to 
go into business for themselves; that they want to start a company. They are then 
assumed to search for and evaluate several alternative business ideas before they settle 
for one, which they develop further and eventually create their business around. 
Bhave (1994) found that an alternative process was also common. In this second 
model it is a specific opportunity rather than a long nurtured dream that triggers the 
decision to found a firm. Consequently, no search for alternative business ideas is 
involved; either a start-up is attempted around the one, triggering opportunity or no 
start-up is attempted.   
In a previous report we showed that CAUSEE data suggest the latter, 
‘business idea as trigger’ process is much more common than is the sequence where 
the decision to start a business comes first (Davidsson et al., 2008). As shown in 
Table 3, somewhat surprisingly the HP founders even more emphasise the idea rather 
than the wish to start a business as the trigger.  The difference to other firms is 
sizeable, especially for YFs. 
 
Table 3.  Trigger of start-up process 
 
 Nascent Firms (NF) Young Firms (YF) 
 High 
Potential 
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
The specific idea for the business came first 67 47 60 34 
The decision to start a business came first  13 16 21 25 
Both together 21 37 20 41 
 
However, these results should be interpreted keeping in mind the high levels 
of experience and parallel running of other businesses of the HP founders. Bhave 
(1994) arguable sketches two routes for a previous non-entrepreneur to switch to self-
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employment. Some nurture a dream of running their own business; actively seek and 
evaluate opportunities for doing so, and eventually take the leap when they have 
found an attractive enough business opportunity. Others have no intention to become 
self-employed but drift into that when they stumble over an opportunity that makes 
this a logical career choice. The CAUSEE data seem to suggest that often neither of 
these apply for HP start-ups. Rather, we are dealing with experienced entrepreneurs 
who are not determined to start another business or actively looking for opportunities 
to do so. They may instead be fully occupied with other ventures or having intended 
to retire. However, when coming across an opportunity that appears attractive they are 
willing to give it a go. Importantly, if this interpretation is correct it also means that 
they will be quite willing to give it up if it does not seem to deliver on the initial 
promise (cf. Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997). This is unlike novice founders of 
start-ups with lower potential who may cling to the not-so-promising start-up. Future 
waves of CAUSEE data collection will show whether HP founders are more prone to 
terminate the start-up attempt. 
 
Perceived competitive advantages  
 
 Parts of the CAUSEE data collection takes the Resource-Based View (RBV) 
as its vantage point (see, e.g., Barney & Arikan, 2001).  This theoretical perspective 
holds that the key to competitive success lies in the creation, identification and 
exploitation of the firm’s unique (and preferably sustainable) resource advantages.  
 Considering their larger infusions of human and financial capital it may be 
viewed as self-evident that HPs would report more perceived competitive advantages. 
However, for at least two reasons – one methodological and one substantive – such a 
result is not obvious. The methodological reason is that more experience founders – 
which HP founders are – may be more realistic about their advantages and 
disadvantages relative to competition and therefore report less exaggerated responses. 
The substantive reason is that even if HPs are better resourced they are also likely to 
operate in much tougher competitive environments, so relative to their competition 
their position could well be weaker than that of non-HP firms. 
  
Table 4.  Perceived resource advantages 
  
  Nascent Firms (NF) Young Firms (YF) 
  High 
Potential
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
 Overall average  4.2  4.0  4.1  3.9 
          
 Uniqueness of Produce / Service  4.7  4.3  4.6  4.0 
 Industry Knowledge  4.2  3.9  4.1  3.7 
 Marketing   3.6  3.3  3.7  3.3 
 Technical Expertise   4.3  4.0  4.2  3.9 
 Flexibility   4.5  4.4  4.5  4.3 
           
 Cost advantages   3.8  3.8  3.9  3.7 
 Use of Networks  4.0  4.0  3.9  3.7 
          
 Difficulty of other firms to copy key advantage  3.4  2.8  3.6  2.8 
 Difficulty to overcome key disadvantage 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.0 
 Note: All entries refer to group averages on 5-point scales. 
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As shown in Table 4, the HPs do report more resource advantages than do 
non-HPs. We may also note that the high averages indicate considerable optimism in 
both groups. Considering characteristics reported earlier it is not a surprise that HP 
founders report more advantages in terms of product uniqueness, industry knowledge 
and technical expertise. The marketing advantage is not surprising given the HPs 
reported marketing experience. However, considering that the competition may be 
large firms it is somewhat surprising that this perceived advantage is of similar 
magnitude as those others just reported. Conversely, flexibility (hardly a ‘resource’ 
but possibly a source of competitive advantage) is a typical small/new firm advantage, 
but only for YFs is there a significant difference between HPs and non-HPs.  
It should be noted that the reported differences of 0.2 to 0.5 on a five-point 
scale are statistically significant but substantively not very large. The modest 
differences may may be due to HPs facing a tougher competitive environment, as 
argued above. This could explain the otherwise surprising (in the light of their greater 
experience and incidence of team start-ups) lack of difference for use of networks. 
That HPs do not rely primarily on cost advantages is hardly surprising. It may be 
noted, though, that at least one comprehensive study suggested that to maintain their 
success, innovative ‘first movers’ need to develop cost advantages (Durand & 
Coeurderoy, 2001).  
As regards sustainability of advantage a large difference was found for the 
perceived degree of difficulty for other firms to imitate the focal firm’s key advantage. 
However, this difference is to be expected considering the higher frequency of IP 
protection among HPs. There is no difference between HPs and non-HPs in the 
reported difficulty to overcome key disadvantages. 
 
 HP businesses take longer/are harder to get up and running 
 
An important part of the CAUSEE questionnaire investigates what ‘gestation 
activities’ have already been undertaken, and when. This information is available only 
for Nascent Firms because Young Firms would presumably have completed all 
relevant gestation activities. A comparison of between HPs and non-HPs for this 
package of questions is telling. These results, which are are reported in Table 5, 
clearly show that HPs have on average completed more activities. To some extent this 
could be because more activities are relevant in their cases (cf. Liao & Welsch, 2003). 
However, it definitely also reflects that they have been in the start-up process longer. 
Based on the ‘time stamping’ of the activities, the nascent HPs have on average been 
in the process for 35.5 months while the non-HPs have been attempting the start-up 
for less than 22 months. This is a sizeable difference3.   
At the same time, the data show that despite this the HPs have to a lesser 
extent reached those milestones that are, arguably, the most essential for reaching an 
operational stage: getting the product/service ready for sale, and generating income. 
The fact that despite having worked on the start-up for a longer period HPs do not 
have higher frequencies for acquisition of major equipment/facilities or arranging 
liability insurance is probably also related to not being ready for the market for quite 
some time yet. Some of the other non-differences may be due to HP founders having 
more prior experience.  
                                                 
3 This also means that the proportion of HPs of all start-ups that are initiated during a particular year is 
likely to be less than the approximately 10 percent we have in our sample. This is because the longer 
start-up process the HPs are eligible for sampling over a longer period of time and therefore – in a 
sense – over sampled when a sample of on-going start-up efforts is drawn on a particular date. 
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Table 5.  Completion of gestation activities 
 
 Nascent Firms (NF) 
Gestation Activity (% ‘yes’) High Potential Other 
Activities with higher completion rate for HPs  
Business formally registered 75 55 
Legal form established 83 65 
Marketing efforts commenced 65 50 
Proprietary technology developed [HP criterion] 50 8 
Applied for IP protection [HP criterion] 48 6 
Prepared written business plan 54 23 
Competitor analysis 81 64 
Assessed market opportunity 87 62 
Financial projections 72 43 
Assessed regulatory requirements 75 60 
Opened bank account 66 39 
Sought external funding 39 16 
Received external funding 31 11 
Established supplier credit 32 22 
Started work full time for venture (any founder) 67 35 
Hired employee(s) 38 11 
Retained accountant 70 45 
Retained lawyer 56 12 
Joined trade association (for this start-up) 25 16 
Contacted assistance organisation (ditto) 59 32 
Joined business network (ditto)  21 11 
Business contactable via phone and/or email 84 73 
Registered for ABN 74 66 
Registered for GST 61 35 
Registered for PAYG 32 15 
Activities with lower or equal completion rate for HPs 
Product/service ready for sale 43 54 
Purchased/leased major equipment/facilities 45 51 
Received income 40 48 
Attended business class (for this start-up) 49 47 
Arranged liability insurance 36 31 
Joined online business community 27 21 
 
All in all, this analysis demonstrates that HP start-ups take longer time and are 
significantly more difficult to bring to completion. 
 
HP start-ups are more internationally orientated 
 
 Table 5 shows that a large share of HP start-ups perceives market 
opportunities abroad to be more attractive than those available in the domestic market. 
Their sales in foreign markets – in the case of NF intended sales – are also much 
higher than for non-HP start-ups. 
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Table 5.  Internationalisation 
 
 Nascent Firms (NF) Young Firms (YF) 
 High 
Potential 
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
International opportunities more attractive than 
domestic, % 
63 22 51 18 
Domestic opportunities more attractive than 
international, % 
7 44 18 44 
Proportion of (intended) sales generated in 
international markets, % 
37 7 14 5 
 
 These observations are, arguably, fully in line with what anybody would 
expect. However, there is another important observation to be made here. This is that 
despite their high evaluation of international opportunities the actual international 
sales of high potential, young firms are modest – 14 percent of revenue on average. 
This figure is also much lower than the 37 percent international sales that nascent HPs 
aim for. These results indicate that while international opportunities may seem 
attractive they are not easy to bring to realisation during the early life of a new firm. 
The lower rated attractiveness by YFs compared to NFs also indicates that 
international opportunities may sometimes seem less attractive when firms learn the 
true investment of money and effort needed to realise them. 
 
 
HP start-ups funding patterns are not as distinct as one could expect 
 
We have noted above that, as expected, much more money has been invested 
in the average HP start-up than in its non-HP counterpart. In this section we take a 
closer – albeit still somewhat cursory – look at the funding patterns for HP and non-
HP start-ups. More specifically, Table 6 reports what percentage in each sub-group 
uses a range of alternative sources of funding at all, either as a minor or a major 
source of funding.  
There are two things from this analysis that we find particularly interesting. The 
first is the widespread non-use of many funding sources, even among HP start-ups. 
Only one source – personal savings – is used by a majority of all subgroups, and no 
other source is used by a majority in any analysed sub-group. Further, many sources 
of funding are used by 20 percent or less of the members in any sub-group. The 
second particularly interesting finding is the relatively small HP vs. non-HP 
differences that are found for many funding sources. Where thes differences are 
pronounced – for example, government grants and business angels – it is a direct 
consequence of the types of sources that have been utilised for the over sampling of 
HPs. In the randomly sampled part of the HP samples the proportions using these two 
sources are much lower; 5 and 8 percent for NFs, and 15 and 5 percent for YFs, 
respectively. For many other funding sources the HP vs. non-HP differences must be 
judged surprisingly small given the vastly different characteristics of the two groups 
(see Table 1 and surrounding text). This is perhaps particularly pronounced for bank 
products. Although this analysis is too coarse-gained to establish this with any 
certainty, the limited use of bank products for start-ups in general, and the similarity 
of use by HPs and non-HPs, may reflect that banks are not capitalizing on the start-up 
business market to the extent that they could, and that they may not be segmenting 
that market effectively in their efforts to serve it. This speculation, of course, is 
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assuming that this market could at all be attractive for an actor that has the 
asymmetrical share in upside gain vs. downside risk that is typical for a lender.   
 
 Table 6.  Sources of funding 
 
 Nascent Firms Young Firms 
Funding source (% using as minor or major 
source) 
High 
Potential 
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
Personal savings 82 87 76 75 
Personal credit card 48 46 49 47 
Money from another business that the 
founders’ also own 
34 12 19 4 
Government grants 24 7 39 5 
Delayed payment terms from suppliers 20 13 30 16 
Advance payment from customers 14 15 34 21 
Loans from family members 16 14 19 8 
Loans from friends, employers or colleagues 6 6 5 4 
Founders’ personal secured-bank loans 17 17 11 16 
Founders’ other personal loans, overdraft or 
other credit facilities from a bank  
17 16 22 15 
Secured bank loans to the business itself 7 9 13 9 
Other loans, overdraft or other credit facilities 
from a bank to the business itself 
6 7 16 8 
Loans from any other organisation to the 
business itself 
6 4 11 5 
Equity from family members 6 6 19 8 
Equity from friends, employers or colleagues 10 1 12 1 
Equity from other private investors (‘business 
angels’) 
17 1 17 1 
Equity from Venture Capital firms or any other 
organisations  
n.a.1) n.a.1) n.a.1) n.a.1) 
1) Due to an error in the data collection procedure this information was not correctly 
recorded. However, we know from ownership questions elsewhere in the questionnaire that 6 
percent of the HPs and virtually none of the non-HPs had VCs as part owners. 
 
The YF vs. NF difference among HPs is also worth noting in this table. It 
appears that due to their increasing funding needs, HPs use a broader range of funding 
sources over time without favouring any particular source very strongly. Interestingly, 
this also include a non-trivial occurrence of equity and loans from friends and family, 
which sources are less used by other categories of start-ups. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that even in a sample carefully singled out to 
represent the ‘high potential’ end of the spectrum, business angels and formal venture 
capitalists are involved only in a small minority of the cases. 
 
Use of advisors 
 
 We know that by definition, HPs have higher levels of human capital 
internally in the form of education and experience of the founders. But what about the 
use of external competence? In a previous section it emerged that nascent HPs to a 
much greater extent had already retained an accountant (70 vs. 45 percent) and/or a 
lawyer (56 vs. 12 percent). The latter, which is a very large difference for this type of 
data, is likely due to the greater monetary stakes involved and the higher incidence in 
the HP group of intellectual property that is potentially possible to protect.  
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 Table 7 provides some further information regarding the use of external 
sources of advice among HP and non-HP start-up. The table is structured in the same 
way as Table 6, above. That is, for each of a range of sources the proportion using it 
as either a minor or a major source of advice is indicated. 
 
Table 7.  Sources of advice 
 
 Nascent Firms (NF) Young Firms (YF) 
Source of advice  (% using as minor or major 
source) 
High 
Potential 
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
Family members 36 53 47 49 
Friends, employers or colleagues 67 64 64 63 
External investors like venture capitalists or 
‘business angels’ 
n.a.1) n.a.1) 31 7 
Board members other than those categories 
already mentioned 
39 13 26 7 
Bank staff member 19 15 17 12 
Potential/actual customers  67 62 59 54 
Potential/actual suppliers 56 43 35 36 
Chartered accountant 50 38 54 51 
Lawyer 41 18 49 20 
Consultant at government agency or not-for-
profit organisation 
41 26 36 19 
Independent tax consultant 23 19 17 26 
Other commercial consultant 34 13 33 15 
Internet websites or communities 57 51 53 44 
Other business media (print & TV/radio) 48 40 46 38 
1) Due to an error in the data collection procedure this information was not correctly recorded. 
 
The results show that the higher internal competence of HPs does not prevent 
them from also using external competence to a greater extent than non-HPs. Where 
there are notable differences between the groups they tend to be in the direction of 
higher usage for HPs. The exception is in the use of advice from family members, 
which nascent HPs are less likely to rely on than are others. Conversely, potential 
suppliers appear to be more important for nascent HPs than for others. Much higher 
use for HPs than others are also found for board members, lawyers and consultants 
other than tax consultants. Non-personal sources like Internet and business media are 
also used more by HPs, although the differences here are not dramatic. Bank staff 
members are reported as advisors by less than 20 percent of the cases, and the HP vs. 
non HP-difference is not pronounced for this source of advice. The use of the 
accountant is likewise not dramatically different between HPs and others, but more 
prevalent in all groups. As regards NF vs. YF differences a peculiarity is that board 
members are used much more by nascent firm founders than those running firms that 
are already operational.    
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Conclusions 
 
In this research we have singled out an ‘elite’ category of business start-ups 
that is characterised by having founders with high levels of education and relevant 
business experience and high future aspirations for the business, and being based on 
business ideas with greater novelty and technological sophistication. We call this 
group of start-ups the ‘high potential’ (HP) businesses. Not all members of this group 
excel on every indicator of the above criteria; however, across the criteria they score 
higher in total than do start-ups not included in the HP category. Only about ten 
percent of start-ups in a random sample meet the minimum criteria for inclusion. 
We have compared the HP start-ups with the majority of start-ups that do not 
meet our HP criteria. Many of these non-HP start-ups may excel on some individual 
criteria; however, in total they do not have a combination of human capital, aspiration 
and technological sophistication that warrants inclusion in the HP group. 
When we contrast the groups we find the following: 
• HPs are very often founded by teams, in particular by non-spousal 
teams. This difference is particularly marked among HP and non HP 
firms that have reached (and for some time survived) an operational 
stage. This indicates that having a team rather than going solo may be a 
success factor for HP start-ups.  
• HP start-ups appear often to be initiated by experienced entrepreneurs 
who are not on a determined search for new opportunities to start 
another business, but who are willing to try it out when they happen to 
come across a promising opportunity. This pattern could also indicate 
that they are prone to give up the start-up effort if new information 
suggests it is less promising than first thought. 
• We find clear evidence that HP business are harder to get up and 
running than are other start-ups. Despite having been in the process for 
a longer time; having completed more ‘gestation activities’, and being 
run by more experienced founders, the nascent HP start-ups are less 
rather than more likely to have a product or service ready for sale or to 
have started to generate income.  
• The HP start-ups are more attracted to international market 
opportunities. However, there is also indication that HPs find it hard to 
realise these international opportunities to the extent envisioned. 
• As regards the use of funding sources the most striking result is the 
relatively low use of many sources of funding, and also that the use of 
funding sources are more similar for HPs and non-HPs than one might 
have expected. It is also worth noting that business angels and venture 
capitalists while almost exclusively engaging with HP rather than non-
HP start-ups are involved with but a small minority of the HP category.  
• Despite their higher internal levels of education and experience, HP 
founders use outside sources of information and advice to a greater 
extent than do non-HP founders. The largest relative HP vs. non-HP 
differences are found for the use of lawyers and commercial 
consultants other than tax advisors.  
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